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I. INTRODUCTION
Previous research suggests that judges make more favorable rulings for
female litigants in family court cases and in criminal sentencing.  Although
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such trends might arise from real differences between men and women,
they might also arise from stereotypes that cause judges to favor mothers 
over fathers and to show leniency towards female defendants.  We tested
for benevolent sexism among 714 sitting trial judges with two experiments in
which we presented judges with hypothetical cases in which we only
varied the gender of the litigants.  In a family court case, we found judges 
were more apt to grant a request to allow relocation by a mother than by
an otherwise identical father.  In a criminal case, we found that judges 
sentenced a female defendant to less prison time than an otherwise
identical male defendant. The results demonstrate that judges engage in 
benevolent sexism towards female litigants in common legal settings. 
The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon
closer inspection, been revealed as a cage.
-Ruth Bader Ginsburg1 
“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of sex.”2  So states Section I of 
the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”),3 as recently passed by the Virginia 
Legislature.4  Whether or not the ERA becomes part of the United 
States Constitution,5 statutes that explicitly discriminate against women, 
banning female participation in everything from jury service to bar 
membership, are largely a relic of the past.6  Law now demands egalitarian
treatment by public officials as well,7 especially judges.  Judges promise to 
1. KATIE L. GIBSON, RUTH BADER GINSBURG’S LEGACY OF DISSENT: FEMINIST
RHETORIC AND THE LAW 43 (2018). 
2. Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d 
Cong. (1972). 
3. Id.
 4. See Laura Vozzella, Virginia Senate passes federal Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 15, 2019, 12:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/
virginia-senate-passes-federal-equal-rights-amendment/2019/01/15/9836d4fe-18f5-11e9-
88fef9f77a3bcb6c_story.html [https://perma.cc/P7VH-9D76].
5. See Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon & Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights 
Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 117 (1997) (arguing that the “ERA is properly before the 
states for ratification.”); Michael C. Dorf, The Equal Rights Amendment and Article V, 
VERDICT (Jan. 20, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/01/22/the-equal-rights-amendment-
and-article-v [https://perma.cc/3S5R-PGKH] (“[W]hether the ERA takes its place as the 
28th Amendment remains uncertain.”). 
6. See DEBORAH L RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY
1–2 (1997) (asserting that although women have de jure equality in most areas, they lack 
de facto equality). 
7. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a)–(e); 2000e-
3(b). 
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be impartial in their decisions,8 and model codes of judicial conduct prohibit 
consideration of gender as a basis for decision making.9  One of the  
fundamental axioms of our justice system is formal equality; justice must 
be rendered “without respect to persons.”10 
A legal requirement of equality, of course, will not invariably produce 
equal treatment.  Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act requires equality
in the private workplace, but women continue to earn less than men and 
have fewer opportunities in many workplaces.11  Likewise, judges face
similar, perhaps even more prominent, prohibitions against racial 
discrimination, and yet disparities between the outcomes of African-
American and white litigants persist.12  Legal rules might be unwittingly
complicit in gender discrimination.  Even if facially neutral, rules privileging 
8. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (“I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent upon me . . . .”). 
9. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
(“A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest 
bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or 
harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, 
age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation . . . .”).  
Note that throughout we use the term “gender” unless a statute uses the term “sex.”  Our 
experimental materials do not actually distinguish between the two, as we discuss infra at 
note 125, but the biases we document are best thought of as arising from a judge’s reactions 
to litigants who identify as male as compared to those who identify as female.  We 
nevertheless sometimes use the term “sexism” rather than “genderism,” because the latter 
does not seem to be a widely accepted term.  Our research does not address bias against 
other categories of gender or bias against LGBTQ individuals. 
10.  28 U.S.C. § 453. 
11. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT. NO. 1045, HIGHLIGHTS OF 
WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2012 1 (2013) (reporting that, nationwide in 2012, women earned 
an average of $691 per week, or 80.9% of the average amount earned by men, which was 
$854 per week); Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, 
Gender Gap in Pay, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/03/22/gender-pay-gap-facts/ [https://perma.cc/53ZF-BAQ9] (“The gender pay 
gap has narrowed since 1980, but it has remained relatively stable over the past 15 years 
or so.  In 2018, women earned 85% of what men earned . . . . Based on this estimate it 
would take an extra 39 days of work for women to earn what men did in 2018.”). See
generally Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends,
and Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 789 (2017) (providing a thorough review of
the causes of the gender pay gap). 
12. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the 
Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI. 203, 221 (2017) 
(“African-American defendants consistently receive harsher sentences than white defendants.” 
(citing Ojmarrh Mitchell, A Meta-Analysis of Race and Sentencing Research: Explaining 
the Inconsistencies, 21 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 439 (2005)). 
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particular types of damages claims over others may disadvantage those 
whose claims tend disproportionately to fall within disfavored categories, 
such as statutory caps on noneconomic damages.13  More commonly, perhaps, 
stereotypes and implicit biases can influence judgment.14 
Gender discrimination, however, can manifest itself differently than
racial discrimination.  Racial discrimination, particularly involving African
Americans, is almost invariably negative.15  Gender discrimination, however,
sometimes appears to benefit women—at least superficially.16 For example, 
male offenders receive longer prison sentences than female offenders,17 
and mothers are more apt than fathers to receive custody of children after
divorce.18 
13. See Rebecca Korzec, Maryland Tort Damages: A Form of Sex-Based Discrimination, 
37 U. BALT. L. F. 97, 98–103 (2007) (“Contemporary tort law elevates some types of 
injuries, giving them more protection and awarding greater damages.  Claims and injuries 
associated with women often receive less legal protection in the societal hierarchy which 
tort doctrine reflects.  For example, tort doctrine places a higher value on physical injury 
and property loss than emotional harm.”).  Because women earn less, they recover less for 
lost wages than otherwise similarly situated men.  See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, 
His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustices in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 80 (1995). 
14. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Biases:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 947 (2006) (“[T]he science of implicit cognition 
suggests that actors do not always have conscious, intentional control over the processes 
of social perception, impression formation, and judgment that motivate their actions.”). 
15. See id. at 956 (“[A]ny non-African-American subgroup of the United States
population will reveal high proportions of persons showing statistically noticeable implicit 
race bias in favor of EA relative to AA.”). 
16. Policies that benefit some women in the short run may be harmful to most
women in the long run.  See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
797, 830 (1989) (arguing that policies that facilitate women’s differentiation from men in 
economic life have “encouraged women to ‘choose’ their own repression”). 
17. See Stephanie Bontrager, Kelle Barrick & Elizabeth Stupi, Gender and
Sentencing: A Meta-Analysis of Contemporary Research, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 
349, 366 (2013) (concluding that “[o]verall, 65% of the estimates indicate that women 
have better sentencing outcomes than men,” but adding that there may be a trend toward 
a reduction in that disparity); Margareth Etienne, Sentencing Women: Reassessing the 
Claims of Disparity, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 73, 73 (2010) (“The evidence is clear 
that courts punish women less often than men for the same offenses, and even when they 
do punish women, they punish them less severely than their male counterparts.”); Amy 
Farrell, Geoff Ward & Danielle Rousseau, Intersections of Gender and Race in Federal 
Sentencing: Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of Representative Court Authorities, 14 
J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 85, 85 (2010) (“Decades of research confirm that women receive 
less-severe sanctions than men across all phases of the criminal justice system.”); Cassia 
Spohn, The Effects of the Offender’s Race, Ethnicity, and Sex on Federal Sentencing Outcomes 
in the Guidelines Era, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 75, 96 (2013) (“Compared to female 
offenders, male offenders had higher odds of pretrial detention and lower odds of 
receiving substantial assistance departures.  Males also received longer sentences than 
females.”). 
 18. Robert Hughes, Jr., Are Custody Decisions Biased in Favor of Mothers?, 
HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (June 8, 2011, 11:57 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/are-
104
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Benevolent sexism, like any invidious bias, arises from implicit attitudes
as well as explicit stereotyping that has harmful implications for women.19 
The effects of gender stereotyping depend on the context.  Stereotypical
traits attributed to women create advantages for women in some circumstances,
but disadvantages in others.20  The belief that women make better parents 
of young children, for example, might benefit female litigants in family 
court, but people who harbor this attitude are also apt to believe that the proper 
role of women in society is as mothers and might thus have difficulty hiring 
and promoting women in the workplace.21 “Benevolent sexism” and “hostile 
sexism” are two sides of the same coin.22  Regardless of whether it helps
or hurts women, gender has an impact.  In many contexts, justice may be 
blind, but it is not gender neutral.23 
Do judges still engage in benevolent sexism?  To attempt to answer that
question, we used experimental methods to test for benevolent sexism in 
two areas of law: family law and criminal sentencing. Specifically, the
714 trial judges in our study reviewed either a hypothetical family court 
case or a criminal sentencing case.  Each judge reviewed a version of the
facts in which we identified the moving party (family law) or the defendant 
(sentencing) as either male or female. We held all other facts constant so
that any difference between the two scenarios necessarily arose solely
from the gender of the parties.  Unlike archival studies of actual decisions,
by comparing the reactions of the judges in the two versions of our scenarios,
custody-decisions-bia_b_870709 [https://perma.cc/S98H-ACLX] (“Across a wide range
of jurisdictions the estimates are that mothers receive primary custody 68–88% of the time, 
fathers receive primary custody 8–14%, and equal residential custody is awarded in only 
2–6% of the cases.”). 
19. See Melissa L. Breger, Making the Invisible Visible: Exploring Implicit Bias, 
Judicial Diversity, and the Bench Trial, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1043–45 (2019). 
20. See Carlos Berdejó, Gender Disparities in Plea Bargaining, 94 IND. L.J. 1247, 
1248–49 (2019) (“There is also extensive work examining gender disparities that adversely 
impact women in many other areas including the sciences, sports, healthcare, and even in 
the purchase of a new car.”). 
21. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 
1153–59 (2012) (reviewing how implicit biases and cultural commitments might affect 
employment decisions).
22. See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent
Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 109, 109 
(2001) [hereinafter Glick & Fiske, Ambivalent Alliance]; Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, 
Ambivalent Sexism Revisited, 35 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 530, 532 (2011). 
23. See generally Naomi Ellemers, Gender Stereotypes, 69 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 275 
(2018) (providing a thorough review of the gender stereotype literature). 
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we can unambiguously determine whether gender of the litigants influenced 
their judgments. 
Although in some—maybe many—areas of law women might fare worse 
than men,24 child custody and sentencing decisions seem like areas in which 
benevolent sexism might hold sway over judges. Judges might believe, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, that women make better parents than men 
and decide family law matters accordingly.  Likewise, they might see men 
as more threatening than women and might sentence accordingly.  Furthermore, 
both areas of law afford judges discretion, allowing judges ample opportunity 
to express implicit or explicit stereotypes.25 
We found that gender mattered to the judges.  Judges were more inclined
to grant a request to disrupt an existing familial arrangement from a 
mother than from a father, even though the circumstances were identical. 
Likewise, judges sentenced a male defendant more harshly than an otherwise
identical female defendant.  We conclude that benevolent sexism influences
contemporary judges.
We report these results in three parts in this paper.  Part II reviews existing
evidence for benevolent sexism among judges.  Parts III and IV and present 
our study of benevolent sexism in a family court setting and in a sentencing 
setting, respectively. Part V contains a discussion of our results and
conclusions.
II. BENEVOLENT SEXISM IN FAMILY COURT AND
CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
Men and women likely have different experiences in the courtroom that 
arise from gender-role stereotypes in society.26  Given the wage disparity
between genders, it is not surprising, for example, that civil juries award 
injured male plaintiffs more than female plaintiffs.27  Likewise, given the
24. See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 35 (1994); 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 710 (2007). 
25. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical 
Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 403–04 (1996) (“Judicial 
discretion has also been enhanced by the rarity of jury trials in divorce cases; in almost all 
divorce actions the judge both determines the facts and interprets the law.”). 
26. See, e.g., Erik J. Girvan, Grace Deason & Eugene Borgida, The Generalizability
of Gender Bias: Testing the Effects of Contextual, Explicit, and Implicit Sexism on Labor 
Arbitration Decisions, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 525, 529 (2015) (undergraduates were more 
likely to deny a wrongful termination grievance in a stereotypically masculine workplace 
if the grievant was female). 
27. See Erik Girvan & Heather J. Marek, Psychological and Structural Bias in Civil 
Jury Awards, 8 J. AGGRESSION, CONFLICT & PEACE RSCH. 247, 253 (2016) (finding that 
juries awarded female plaintiffs merely 59% of what they awarded male plaintiffs).  Several 
mock-jury studies replicate this result in an experimental setting.  See Jane Goodman, Edith 
106
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value society places on female appearance, cases involving facial disfigurement 
produce higher awards for female plaintiffs.28  Some research suggests
that asylum judges favor women, possibly owing to a benevolent sexism 
that triggers a greater desire to protect women.29  The pattern of attorney-
fee awards also favors women, perhaps for similar reasons.30  The same
attitude, however, might explain why judges are more apt to invalidate a 
will executed by a woman for undue influence than a will executed by a 
man.31  Even lawyers and judges experience sexism, benevolent and otherwise, 
in the courtroom.32 
Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Meek Juror 
Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 285, 296 (1989). 
28. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of
State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 39 (1996) (finding that “juries 
often award women higher damages than men for facial scarring, while they award men 
more money than women for loss of wages or physical strength.”); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey 
J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison
of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 894–95 (1993) (both prospective
jurors and arbitrators awarded more for a disfiguring scar when the plaintiff was female in 
a simulated medical malpractice case).
29. See Alejandro Ecker, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik & Martin Haselmayer, Gender 
Bias in Asylum Adjudications: Evidence for Leniency toward Token Women, 82 SEX ROLES 
117, 117 (2019) (finding that Austrian judges confronting a caseload consisting predominately 
of male asylum applicants were strongly biased in favor of female applicants, but judges 
confronting a gender-balanced caseload were not). 
30. See Talia Fisher et al., He Paid, She Paid: Exploiting Israeli Courts’ Rulings
on Litigation Costs to Explore Gender Biases, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 536, 536 
(2016) (finding that unsuccessful male plaintiffs were more likely than unsuccessful female 
plaintiffs to be ordered to pay the winners’ attorneys’ fees, that unsuccessful female plaintiffs 
were ordered to pay less than unsuccessful male plaintiffs, and that prevailing female 
defendants received larger attorneys’ fees awards than similarly situated male defendants). 
31. Veena K. Murthy, Undue Influence and Gender Stereotypes: Legal Doctrine or 
Indoctrination?, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 105, 112–13 (1997) (finding that in a hypothetical 
case 61.8% of appellate judges determined that a will executed by a woman should be 
invalidated for undue influence as compared to 30.3% of judges reviewing the same will 
executed by a man).  But see Patricia R. Recupero et al., Gender Bias and Judicial Decisions 
of Undue Influence in Testamentary Challenges, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 60, 65 
(2015) (presenting a study of 117 probate judges from nine states, finding that “judges’ 
opinions about the presence of undue influence did not differ . . . even when the genders 
of the testator and beneficiary were reversed”). 
32. See Tonya Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice Interrupted: The Effect of Gender,
Ideology and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1381– 
85, 1404, 1458, 1467, 1470, 1474, 1478, 1493 (2017) (male U.S. Supreme Court justices 
interrupt female justices about three times as often as they interrupt male justices); Jessica 
Salerno, Closing with Emotion: The Differential Impact of Male versus Female Attorneys 
Expressing Anger in Court, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 385–88, 397–400 (2018) (male 
 107









   
   
   
  
     
 
 
Disparate outcomes suggest sexism in the courtroom, but some 
disparities might be rational.33  Disparities in damage awards for lost wages, 
for example, likely reflect the wage disparity between men and women, 
however unfair the underlying disparity might be.  In an effort to test 
for clear evidence of benevolent sexism, we focus our attention on two 
areas of law: family law and criminal sentencing.  Both areas seem like 
prime targets for the influence of benevolent sexism.  Most adults— 
both male and female—more strongly associate men with career-oriented 
concepts and women with domestic concepts.34  Men are more apt to 
commit violent acts than women.35  These associations, or implicit biases, 
can lead to judgments that instantiate long-standing stereotypes that will 
benefit women.36 
Implicit biases and associations tend to promote harmful stereotypes.37 
Implicit associations between African Americans and violence might be a 
source of significant racial disparities in the criminal justice system.38 
Implicit beliefs about women also might impede female progress in the
and female observers found angry male attorneys to be commanding, powerful, competent, 
and hirable, but found angry female attorneys to be shrill, hysterical, grating, and ineffective). 
33. See, e.g., Koenig & Rustad, supra note 13, at 9–10; see also Vidmar & Rice,
supra note 28, at 894–95. 
34. See Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting 
Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 
101, 109 (2002) (reporting “robust associations between male-career and female-family” 
among a large sample of adults); see also Nicole Rogus-Pulia et al., How Gender Stereotypes 
May Limit Female Faculty Advancement in Communication and Speech Disorders, 27 
AM. J. SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 1598, 1600 (2018) (“Implicit gender bias is present 
in all individuals, regardless of gender, due to exposure to stereotypes through common 
socialization experiences.”); Argharam Salles, et al., Estimating Implicit and Explicit 
Gender Bias Among Health Care Professionals and Surgeons, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 
(2019) (reporting data indicating that health-care professionals hold implicit and explicit 
biases associating men with careers and women with family, while surgeons hold implicit 
biases associating men with surgery and women with family medicine). 
35. See 2018 Crime in the United States Table 33, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/ 
crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-33 [https://perma.cc/9MDH-4A2Y].
Men accounted for roughly 80% of persons arrested for violent crime.  Id. 
36. See John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt:
A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of 
Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 36, 45–48 (2009) 
(reviewing ten studies that show a correlation between measures of implicit bias and behavior). 
37. See Kang et al., supra note 21, at 1126 (“Using experimental methods in 
laboratory and field studies, researchers have provided convincing evidence that implicit 
biases exist, are pervasive, are large in magnitude, and have real-world effects.”). 
38. See id. at 1150–51 (“In each of the stages of the criminal trial process discussed, 
the empirical research gives us reason to think that implicit biases—attitudes and beliefs 
that we are not directly aware of and may not endorse—could influence how defendants 
are treated and judged.”). 
108
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workplace.39 Implicit biases about Asian Americans reinforce stereotypes
about Asians as withdrawn or shy, making it hard to see Asians in more 
assertive roles, such as litigators.40  The same implicit biases that make it 
hard to see a woman as a top executive or politician, however, also facilitate 
seeing her as a successful parent.41  Although that bias could benefit women
in family court settings, it could also impair women’s success in other 
contexts. Likewise, explicit and implicit associations between men and 
violence might influence sentencing decisions.42 
Professionals might not display the same biases.  Many of the studies cited 
above suggesting disparate treatment involve jury decisions, rather than 
judicial decisions.43  At least one study comparing professional arbitrators
and lay adults showed the effects of gender-role stereotyping in a legal setting 
that professional arbitrators did not display.44  That said, research we discuss 
below in family court decisions45 and in criminal sentencing46 strongly 
suggests that judges treat male and female litigants differently as well.  
Furthermore, our previous research shows that implicit biases influence 
judges.47 
39. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism 
in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 997 (2006) (describing how implicit biases about women can influence hiring and 
promotion decisions). 
40. See Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of 
Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 886, 891–92 (2010) (“[I]mplicit stereotypes 
predicted preferential evaluation of the White litigator (in group favoritism).”). 
41. See Nichole M. Bauer, A Feminine Advantage? Delineating the Effects of Feminine
Trait and Feminine Issue Messages on Evaluations of Female Candidates, 16 POL. & GENDER 
660, 661–64 (2020) (finding that emphasizing feminine traits activates stereotypes about 
women that suggest that women political candidates are less qualified for leadership roles); 
see also Anne M. Koenig et al., Are Leader Stereotypes Masculine? A Meta-Analysis of 
Three Research Paradigms, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 616, 616–18 (2011); Deborah A. 
Prentice & Erica Carranza, What Women and Men Should Be, Shouldn’t Be, Are 
Allowed to Be, and Don’t Have to Be, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 269, 269 (2002). 
42. See Bauer, supra note 41, at 662 (“Feminine stereotypes characterize women as
caring, compassionate, and sensitive and as more likely to engage in supportive communal 
activities.  Masculine stereotypes characterize men as aggressive, tough, and strong and as 
more likely to engage in assertive or agentic behaviors.”). 
43. See, e.g., Kang et al., supra note 21, at 1152–53, 1168, 1179–84. 
44.  Girvan, Deason & Borgida, supra note 26, at 9.
 45. See infra notes 48–88 and accompanying text. 
46. See infra notes 89–122 and accompanying text. 
47. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, 
Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195 
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A. Gender Disparities in Family Court 
Preconceived notions of gender and gender-role stereotypes likely
influence judges’ choices about parental custody.48  That said, gender bias
might harm either men or women.49  On one hand, judges may assume 
that children are better off living with stay-at-home mothers.50 Such 
traditional views of women as nurturing mothers might push judges in 
the direction of allowing the mother to retain custody of the children.51 
Judges also may assume that fathers are less capable caretakers unless they 
demonstrate otherwise.52  These paternalistic stereotypes, which characterize
women as maternal, passive, and dependent on men for protection, serve 
as a basis for such “benevolent sexism” that might favor female litigants 
in many settings in family court.53  Women who move to take better jobs
(2009) (“We find that judges harbor the same kinds of implicit biases as others [and] that
these biases can influence their judgment.”). 
48. See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, A Report from Canada’s ‘Gender War Zone’:
Reforming the Child-Related Provisions of the Divorce Act, 16 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 163, 
177 (1999) (noting that the preference for mothers in custody determinations has led 
fathers’ right’s advocates to believe that it is result of judicial anti-father bias); Paul Millar 
& Sheldon Goldenberg, Explaining Child Custody Determinations in Canada, CANADIAN 
J.L. & SOC’Y, Fall 1998, at 209, 221, 224 (1998) (“[W]hile legislation, and the legal 
standard for custody assignment, has changed [to a gender neutral standard], the empirical 
fact of gender preference has not.”); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Overwhelming Evidence: 
Reports on Gender Bias in the Courts, TRIAL, Feb. 1990, at 28, 28 (1990) (describing 
the efforts of gender bias task forces in various states, all of which found pervasive gender 
bias in family law matters); Kathryn E. Abare, Note, Protecting the New Family: Ireland 
v. Ireland and Connecticut’s Custodial Parent Relocation Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 307, 307
(1999) (describing the custodial mother as a typical gender stereotype). 
49. See, e.g., VT. SUP. CT. & VT. BAR ASS’N, GENDER AND JUSTICE: REPORT OF THE
VERMONT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 100 (1991). But see Lynn 
Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in Family Courts: Why Prejudice Permeates the Process, 17 
FAM. ADVOC. 22, 26 (1994) (explaining that although men are stereotyped in custody 
disputes, they are significantly more successful in receiving primary or joint physical 
custody than commonly believed). 
50. See Kathleen E. Mahoney, The Myth of Judicial Neutrality: The Role of Judicial
Education in the Fair Administration of Justice, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 785, 798 (1996); 
Nugent, supra note 24, at 40; see Elizabeth R. Cole et al., Vive La Difference? Genetic 
Explanations for Perceived Gender Differences in Nurturance, 57 SEX ROLES 211, 212 
(2007) (“Many people believe that women are ‘naturally’ nurturing and caregiving, 
particularly in comparison to men.  This difference is often explained in terms of women’s 
biological capacity to bear and nurse children.”). 
51. See RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION: THE FATHER FACTOR 
AND THE MOTHERHOOD MYSTIQUE 30 (1992) (arguing that stereotypes have had a profound 
influence on custody decisions); Nugent, supra note 24, at 40 (“Custody is an area where 
the biases and stereotypes concerning both sexes influence decision-making.”). 
52. See Nugent, supra note 24, at 40 (“Fathers tend to be perceived as less capable
caretakers and must prove their ability to parent, whereas mothers are presumed to be 
capable.”). 
53. See Glick & Fiske, Ambivalent Alliance, supra note 22, at 115. 
110
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or leave marriages to pursue new relationships are acting against these
traditional female stereotypes, however, which might provoke unconscious
judicial retaliation in child custody and relocation disputes.54  Both hostile 
and benevolent sexism thus seem plausible in the realm of family law. 
Previous research on disparate outcomes in family court cases provide 
evidence of sexism that both benefits and harms female litigants.55 Several
studies show that lay adults who are asked to allocate martial assets 
typically award less than half of the assets to wives—notwithstanding 
legal requirements of an equitable apportionment.56  Judges might also,
whether consciously or not, further penalize women who deviate from 
traditional stereotypes or are otherwise seen as engaging in behavior 
that is harmful to the marriage.57 Custody decisions favor women, 
however.58  Historically, this difference was ensconced in the law in the
54. See Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 48, at 224 (“Fathers who wish to parent
their children post-divorce today face a situation similar to women entering the workforce 
only a few decades ago.”); Nugent, supra note 24, at 40 (“[N]umerous cases document 
situations in which women with live-in boyfriends have lost custody, while men with live-
in girlfriends retain custody.”); Susan Beth Jacobs, Comment, The Hidden Gender Bias 
Behind “The Best Interest of the Child” Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 845, 876, 892–93 (1997) (finding from a study analyzing 378 nationwide custody cases 
between mothers and fathers from 1990 through 1994 that there is gender bias against mothers 
when judges consider parents’ remarriage and extramarital and post-marital sexual 
relationships).
55. See Karen Czapanskiy & Tricia O’Neill, Report of the Special Judicial
Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts – May 1989, 20 U. BALT. L. REV. 4, 47–48 (1990). 
56. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Settling in the Shadow of Sex: Gender Bias in
Marital Asset Division, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1857, 1892–1900 (2019) (reporting an 
experimental study in which research subjects awarded the male spouse a greater share of 
the marital assets than the female spouse); Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, When 
Equitable Is Not Equal: Experimental Evidence on the Division of Marital Assets in 
Divorce, 18 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 655, 658, 666 (2020) (reporting results of an 
experimental study showing that subjects consistently awarded the female spouse less than 
50% of the divorcing couple’s assets). 
57. See Shinall, supra note 56, at 1896–97 (reporting experimental results in which
research subjects disfavored female deviations from traditional roles more than male 
deviations); see also ULRIKE SCHULTZ & GISELA SHAW, GENDER AND JUDGING 35 (2013) 
(finding evidence in family courts that female judges tend to be less generous than their 
male colleagues in cases involving women requesting alimony).  A likely explanation for 
this phenomenon is that female judges who are financially and professionally independent 
are less sympathetic to women who rely financially on their husbands. 
58. See Richard A. Warshak, Gender Bias in Child Custody Decisions, 34 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 396, 397, 406 (1996); Jo-Ellen Paradise, Note, The Disparity 
Between Men and Women in Custody Disputes: Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone’s 
Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 517, 517 (1998) (“A traditional cultural and legal 
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form of the “tender years presumption,” which presupposes that a 
mother is the better parent for a young child.59  Even without this doctrine, 
in the United States, when the court awards sole custody of a child to one 
parent, it is typically to the mother.60 
The fact that far more women than men obtain custody of children after 
divorce is not, by itself, evidence of sexism.  Mothers might be more apt
to seek custody than fathers. Women might also, on average, be better
positioned to assume the responsibilities entailed by custody.  Experimental 
studies using hypothetical cases in which researchers vary only the gender 
of the parties are better able to determine whether sexism causes female
success in such cases.61  Researchers have conducted two such studies; 
both showed that judges favor female claims to custody, even when other 
factors are identical.62 This result dovetails with the strong trend favoring
awards of custody to mothers in actual cases.  That said, judges in the 
experimental studies might merely be relying on a simple heuristic that 
mothers usually get custody, rather than a stereotype that mothers are simply 
always better parents. 
To tease out benevolent sexism more clearly, we chose a slightly different 
area of family law—child relocation decisions.  Child relocation cases present 
some of the most challenging, controversial, and frequently litigated issues in 
family law.63 Deciding whether a custodial parent can move a child some
presumption currently standing is that, upon marital dissolution, children should remain in 
their mother’s custody.”). 
59. See  ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 7 (1992) (“[T]hroughout most of the present 
century the mother was presumed to be the preferred custodian of the children.”); Phyllis 
T. Bookspan, From a Tender Years Presumption to a Primary Parent Presumption: Has 
Anything Really Changed? . . . Should It?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 75, 78 (1993). 
60. See TIMOTHY GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS 
AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2013 4 (2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ 
library/publications/2016/demo/P60-255.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWH9-46H5].
61. See, e.g., Andrea L. Miller, Expertise Fails to Attenuate Gendered Biases in
Judicial Decision-Making, 10 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 227, 232 (2018). 
62. See Miller, supra note 61; Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 48, at 224. Also, 
one experiment demonstrating that people favor mothers in custody decisions used law 
students as an analogue to judges.  See Luiza Lopes Franco Costa el al., Gender Stereotypes 
Underly Child Custody Decisions, 49 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 548, 556 (2019). 
63. See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 148 (N.Y. 1996) (explaining that
relocation cases present the “knottiest and most disturbing problems” in family law); Gary 
A. Debele, A Children’s Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best Interests 
Standard, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 75, 75 (1998) (describing the controversy over the 
proper standard to apply in child relocation cases as “pervasive and vexatious”); Lucy S. 
McGough, Starting Over: The Heuristics of Family Relocation Decision Making, 77 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 293 (2003) (describing relocation cases as a “burning issue” in 
Europe, Canada, Australia, and the United States); D. A. Rollie Thompson, Movin’ On: 
Parental Relocation in Canada, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 398, 398 (2004) (explaining that in 
112
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distance from the noncustodial parent forces a judge to choose “between
allowing the custodial parent to pursue economic and personal opportunities 
which benefit both her and the child and the desire to facilitate the child’s 
involvement with both parents.”64 
In the United States, the statutory and judicial approaches to relocation 
cases vary from state to state and “uniformity is woefully lacking.”65  If
the relocation issue arises during the initial custody determination, most 
courts apply the “best interest of the child” standard.66  If the relocation 
dispute arises after custody has been determined, then the original custody 
order must be modified.67 In such cases, the parent requesting modification 
generally bears the initial burden of demonstrating a material change of 
circumstances that warrants a hearing on whether the child’s custody should 
change.68  If the proposed relocation amounts to changed circumstances,
the judge must then decide whether it is in the child’s best interest to move 
with the custodial parent or to award custody to the nonmoving parent.69 
Canada relocation is the most frequently contested issue in child custody and parenting). 
Most family law judges also believe that relocation cases are the “toughest and most time-
consuming” type of custody disputes.  Leslie Eaton, Divorced Parents Move, and Custody 
Gets Trickier, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/08/nyregion/
08custody.html. [perma.cc/XNH9-4HXM].
 64. Abare, supra note 48, at 308 (explaining that relocation disputes inherently
involve gender role issues). 
65. Linda D. Elrod, A Move in the Right Direction? Best Interests of the Child
Emerging as the Standard for Relocation Cases, 3 J. CHILD CUSTODY 29, 30 (2006).  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in 1990 that there is no “consistent, universally 
accepted approach to the question of when a custodial parent may relocate out-of-state 
over the objection of the non-custodial parent.”  Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990), superseded by statute, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5337(h) (2020), as 
recognized in D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467 (Pa. 2014).  Elrod observed that decades later, 
“confusion and controversy remain over what are, and what should be the legal standards 
to apply” in relocation cases.  Elrod, supra, at 31. 
66. Elrod, supra note 65, at 34. 
67.  See id.
 68. See id.
69. There are essentially three approaches as to whether relocation amounts to 
changed circumstances warranting modification.  First, relocation itself is not a change in 
circumstances, and so presumption exists in favor of relocation by the custodial parent.  
See, e.g., Gagnon v. Glowacki, 815 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding 
that relocation was not a change in circumstances and thus the court was not required to 
conduct a “best interest” analysis).  Second, relocation may amount to changed circumstances 
and the court may use shifting presumptions so that the custodial parent bears the initial 
burden to prove good faith and that the move is in the child’s best interest, and then the 
burden shifts to the nonresidential parent to demonstrate that the move is not in the child’s 
best interest.  See, e.g., Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 230–31 (N.J. 2001).  Third, each 
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Some jurisdictions in the United States have also developed a list of 
factors for judges to consider when determining whether relocation is in 
the child’s “best interest.”70  Although these factors vary, they are: the
reasons for and against the move, whether the move will enhance the child’s 
quality of life, and the availability of a realistic substitute visitation schedule 
to maintain the child’s relationship with the nonmoving parent.71 
Relocation cases in Canada are also determined based upon the “best 
interest” standard, but unlike the United States, there is no presumption
for or against relocation.72  Canadian courts apply a multi-factored approach 
adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in Gordon v. Goertz.73  Under
Gordon v. Goertz, a parent seeking to modify a custody agreement must first 
demonstrate that the relocation presents a material change in the child’s 
circumstances.74  Once changed circumstances have been established, the
judge must then determine whether relocating would be in the child’s best 
interest.75  In making the “best interest” determination, Canadian courts
consider a nonexclusive list of seven factors: 
(a) the existing custody arrangement and relationship between the child and the
custodial parent; (b) the existing access arrangement and the relationship between 
the child and the access parent; (c) the desirability of maximizing contact between 
the child and both parents; (d) the views of the child; (e) the custodial parent’s 
reason for moving, only in the exceptional case where it is relevant to that parent’s 
ability to meet the needs of the child; (f) disruption to the child of a change in 
custody; and (g) disruption to the child consequent on removal from family, schools, 
and the community he or she has come to know.76 
Although there is no presumption in favor of the custodial parent, that 
parent’s opinion on whether relocation is in their child’s best interest is 
entitled to “great respect.”77 
party bears the burden of demonstrating why the child’s best interest is to be with them.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cooksey, 125 P.3d 57, 65 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); In re Marriage 
of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 147–48 (Colo. 2005). 
70. Elrod, supra note 65, at 40.  For discussion on the factors developed by leading 
American cases and statutes, see Hon. W. Dennis Duggan, Rock-Paper-Scissors: Playing 
the Odds with the Law of Child Relocation, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 193, 209–11 (2007). 
71. Elrod, supra note 65, at 34. 
72. Hon. Justice Tim Carmody, Child Relocation: An Intractable International Family 
Law Problem, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 214, 214–15 (2007); Thompson, supra note 63, at 398. 
73. See Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, 28 (Can.).  This approach applies to
relocation disputes during initial custody determinations, as well as those that have been 
initiated after the original decree has been issued. 
74. See id. at 28.
 75. See id.
 76. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
77. Id. at 28. 
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The law governing relocation decisions in both countries is thus less 
than clear.78  In the United States, the use of multifactor tests with vague
criteria affords the trial judge considerable discretion.  Canada’s approach 
also has been criticized as creating too much inconsistency by embracing 
a lengthy and imprecise list of factors.79  Judges have little way of knowing 
whether a child’s “best interest” supports allowing a move.  Judges must 
also consider that some evidence suggests that relocation often has negative 
consequences for children’s well-being.80  Consequently, child relocation
decisions are highly discretionary.81  Developing a comprehensive set of
rules may be impossible in this area, and there exists little choice but 
to rely on judges’ sound judgment.82 
The gender of the custodial parent is not supposed to be a factor in 
custody determination and relocation cases,83  but such cases likely trigger 
78. See Duggan, supra note 70, at 193 (“The law of child relocation in America is 
a mess [and i]t is not much better anywhere else.”). 
79. See Thompson, supra note 63, at 407. 
80. See Sanford L. Braver, Ira M. Ellman & William V. Fabricius, Relocation of
Children After Divorce and Children’s Best Interests: New Evidence and Legal 
Considerations, 17 J. FAM. PSYCH. 206, 214 (2003) (“We find a preponderance of negative 
effects associated with parental moves by mother or father, with or without the child, as 
compared to divorced families in which neither parent moved away.”). 
81. See Julie Hixson-Lambson, Comment, Consigning Women to the Immediate 
Orbit of a Man: How Missouri’s Relocation Law Substitutes Judicial Paternalism for 
Parental Judgment by Forcing Parents to Live Near One Another, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1365, 1387–88, 1403–04 (2010). 
82. See Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in
Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83, 84 (2000) (“[T]he impact of 
relocation is dependent on several factors.”)  Thus, it is unlikely that any specific test 
or standard can do justice to a decision as complex as relocation.”). 
83. See, e.g., Linda R. v. Richard E., 561 N.Y.S.2d 29, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(stressing the importance of maintaining gender neutrality in custody determinations);
Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (finding that custody awards
cannot be based directly or indirectly on gender-based preferences or stereotypes); Janet 
M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in a Mobile 
Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791, 873 (1993) (“[C]ustody standards are gender 
neutral”); Eiad El Fateh, A Presumption for the Best?, 25 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 73, 106– 
07 (2009) (explaining that the no-presumption approach set forth in Gordon v. Goertz is 
gender neutral); see also Edward Greer, Custodial Relocation and Gender Warfare: 
Thinking About Section 2.17 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 13 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 235, 287 (2011) (“[M]aximizing the welfare of children . . . requires 
punctilious gender-neutrality.”).  Some state statutes also specifically prohibit the consideration 
of a parent’s gender during custody determination.  For example, under Tennessee’s relocation 
statute, courts cannot consider the gender of the relocating parent as a factor either in favor 
or against relocation.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108(c)(2) (2020).  Similarly, the custody 
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gender stereotypes.  Judges might be more deferential to a relocation 
request from a mother than a father, thinking that a mother is more apt to 
have the child’s best interest than her own career advancement at heart.
Alternatively, judges might think less well of a mother who is seeking to 
relocate to advance her career than a father who has made the same choice.
Existing research on the issue is inconclusive.84  One review of all 
published Missouri appellate court opinions in relocation cases found not 
“a single instance where Missouri’s relocation law was used to bar a father 
from relocating with his children.”85  Absent a comparison with requests
from mothers, however, that result cannot support or undermine any 
conclusions about sexism in relocation decisions.  Another study using 
published opinions on Westlaw over a five-year period found no real 
difference: women were denied permission to relocate 48% of the time, 
while men were denied permission to relocate 51% of the time.86  Published 
opinions, however, might be an unusual and biased tip of the iceberg.  In 
one study of 108 relocation cases in British Columbia trial courts, courts 
allowed mothers to relocate 59% of the time, as compared to only 38% of 
the time for fathers.87  Because mothers made 93% of the requests, however,
the sample size was too small to reach any definitive conclusions.88  Therefore,
little is truly known about whether gender bias influences judges in 
making relocation decisions. 
B. Gender Disparities in Criminal Sentencing 
Disparate sentences based on a defendant’s gender contravene sentencing 
rules89 and basic societal norms.90  Nevertheless, research on criminal
sentencing suggests that judges impose harsher sentences on men than on 
statutes in California, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Pennsylvania all expressly require that
custody determinations be gender neutral. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(i) 
(2020); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(c) (West 2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 112(C)(3)(b)
(2020); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5328(b) (2020). 
84. See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
85. Hixson-Lambson, supra note 81, at 1369. 
 86. Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution
Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 125 (2007). 
87.  El Fateh, supra note 83, at 78. 
88. Id. 
89. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 464 (2018) (“Race, Sex, 
National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status . . . are not relevant in the 
determination of a sentence.”). 
90. See Shaina D. Massie, Note, Orange Is the New Equal Protection Violation: 
How Evidence-Based Sentencing Harms Male Offenders, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
521, 523 (2015) (“Penological considerations of gender in sentencing are simply incompatible 
with abstract notions that criminal offenders appear before the court in their individual 
capacities.”). 
116
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women.91  In fact, “sentencing disparities based on gender are among the 
most visible and persistent sentencing disparities in this country.”92 Women
constitute only 10% of the prison population in the United States.93  The 
disparity in incarceration rates almost certainly reflects a disparity in rates 
at which men and women commit crime.94  Numerous studies, however, 
suggest that benevolent sexism influences sentences.95 
Sentence disparities might not be attributable to judges’ decisions— 
prosecutors,96 probation officers97, and other court officers play a role
in sentencing.  One study by Professor Starr accounts for these various factors 
and demonstrates that males are treated more harshly at every stage of the 
process, from arrest to sentencing.98  Professor Starr’s study showed that 
male criminal arrestees in federal court ultimately receive sentences that 
are 63% longer than their female counterparts, with judicial decisions 
causing only a part of that disparity.99  Because more than 90%  of cases 
91. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING: AN 
UPDATE TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT 2 (2017). 
92. Etienne, supra note 17, at 73; see also Anna Bindler & Randi Hjalmarsson, The 
Persistence of the Criminal Justice Gender Gap: Evidence from 200 Years of Judicial 
Decisions, 63 J.L. & ECON 297, 310–15 (2020) (finding a persistent gender gap favoring 
female offenders in jury convictions and judges’ sentences in the trial of serious criminal 
cases in London during 1715–1900). 
93. See  DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T JUST., NCJ 250374,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 15 (2016) (reporting that 
202,600 of the 2,145,100 people incarcerated in the United States in 2015 were female). 
94. See NADIA CAMPANIELLO, IZA WORLD OF LABOR, WOMEN IN CRIME 3 (2019)
https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/497/pdfs/women-in-crime.pdf?v=1 [https://perma.cc/
CK9D-BT9T] (documenting the existence of a pronounced but shrinking gender gap in
criminal participation).
95. See, e.g., RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
NCJ 253043, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2018, at 26 (2019); Etienne, supra note 17, at 73; 
Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases, 17 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 127, 137–38, 141–42 (2015). 
96. See Spohn, supra note 17, at 81–83 (reporting results of a study of sentencing
in federal court showing that women were more likely to receive favorable sentencing 
departures than men). 
97. See Shawn D. Bushway, Emily G. Owens & Anne Morrison Piehl, Sentencing 
Guidelines and Judicial Discretion: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Human Calculation 
Errors, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 291, 201–02 (2012) (describing the role of probation 
officers in sentencing). 
98. Starr, supra note 95, at 141 (presenting data showing “that significant new 
disparity favoring women appears to be introduced at every stage of the justice process”). 
99. Id. at 138 (“The overall average disparity [between male and female defendants] . . .
is 23 months, or a 63% increase” in sentence length for male defendants relative to female 
defendants.). 
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are resolved by plea,100 and because many plea agreements contain de 
facto stipulated sentences,101 plea negotiations play a larger role in the
process than the sentencing phase.  Moreover, charge bargaining often 
occurs in plea negotiations, a practice which essentially caps the maximum 
sentence, limiting still further the judge’s ability to depart from the sentence 
the parties prefer.102  Professor Starr’s research documents this, showing
that the majority of the sentencing disparity between men and women 
in federal court arises from disparities that occur before the sentencing 
phase.103  Her result replicates an earlier study of sentencing in federal 
court.104  Similar studies of plea bargaining in Wisconsin and California state
court also show that prosecutors are more likely to drop the more serious 
charges against female defendants than male defendants during the plea 
bargaining process.105 
Even when researchers try to control for other factors, judges’ biases
remain a factor in perpetuating the sentencing disparity between male and 
female defendants.106  Multiple studies by the United States Sentencing
Commission have found that even controlling for offense level and 
defendant’s criminal history under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 
100. See John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial and
Most Who Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACTTANK (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-
go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty [https://perma.cc/G2LL-4SXF].
101. Starr, supra note 95, at 129 (“Plea-bargaining can involve negotiations over 
charges, stipulations of ‘sentencing facts’ (for instance, drug quantity), prosecutorial sentencing 
recommendations, and requests for leniency for cooperators.”). 
102. For a review of plea-bargaining practices in federal court, see Stephen J.
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1284 (1991). 
103. Starr, supra note 95, at 141–42 (“Initial charging and charge-bargaining 
contribute about 9% and 4% of the gap, respectively; Guidelines fact-finding explains 
60%, leaving 27% for the final sentencing stage to explain.”).  Guidelines fact-finding is 
heavily influenced by the plea agreement, with 92% of judges in one study reporting that 
their factual findings diverge from the plea agreement either “infrequently” or “never.”  
Scott A. Gilbert & Molly Treadway Johnson, The Federal Judicial Center’s 1996 Survey 
of Guideline Experience, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 89 (1996). 
104. Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions:
Examining Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District 
Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394, 415, 424 (2010). 
105. Berdejó, supra note 20, at 1272 (showing that prosecutors drop the more serious 
charges in 47.48% of cases involving female defendants versus only 39.91% of cases 
involving male defendants); Cassia Spohn, John Gruhl & Susan Welch, The Impact of the 
Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 
25 CRIMINOLOGY 175, 183–84 (1987). 
106. See Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, in 22 
CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 201, 203, 209, 229 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997). 
118
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male offenders received more severe sentences than female offenders.107 
Professor Schanzenbach replicated these results while also accounting for 
demographic variations among judges,108 as did Professors Stacey and 
Spohn.109 Several studies of state court sentencing that also control for
offense type and defendant’s criminal history likewise demonstrate a reliable 
tendency for judges to impose harsher sentences on male defendants.110 
Accounting for individual defendants’ characteristics remains challenging 
in these studies.  Research concerning federal sentences is the most helpful 
in this regard, as the United States Sentencing Guidelines require judges 
to identify a specific offense level and a specific criminal history that 
researchers can use as control variables.111  As Professor Starr points out, 
however, gender bias might influence decisions concerning offense level.112 
Studies that focus on “downward departures” help address this point 
because they focus on a judge’s use of discretion to impose a more lenient 
sentence after all of the factors prescribed by the Guidelines are taken into 
account.113  Three such studies suggest that federal judges are more likely 
to depart downward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines for 
107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 91, at 20 (“After controlling for a wide 
variety of sentencing factors, the Commission found that . . . female offenders of all races 
received shorter sentences than White male offenders.”); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE 
BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 3 (2010). 
108. See Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The 
Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 72, 74, 89–90 
(2005).
109. See Ann Martin Stacey & Cassia Spohn, Gender and the Social Costs of Sentencing:
An Analysis of Sentences Imposed on Male and Female Offenders in Three U.S. District 
Courts, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 43, 46, 63–65, 73, 76 (2006). 
110. See, e.g., Kristin F. Butcher, Kyung H. Park & Anne Morrison Piehl, Comparing 
Apples to Oranges: Differences in Women’s and Men’s Incarceration and Sentencing 
Outcomes, 35 J. LAB. ECON. S201, S203, S207 (2017) (finding that among convicted felons 
in Kansas from 1998–2001, “[o]n average women are 14 (drug crime) to 20 (non-drug 
crime) percentage points less likely to be incarcerated and receive 44 (drug crime) to 12 
(drug crime) percent shorter sentences.”); Darrell Steffensmeier, John Kramer & Cathy 
Streifel, Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 411, 423–28, 435 
(1993).
111. Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Effects of Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes 
for Drug Offenses, 1991–1992, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 789, 789 (1997). 
112. Starr, supra note 95, at 128 (“Most [existing studies] assess the judge’s final 
sentencing decision, controlling for conviction severity or ‘presumptive sentence’ measures 
that are themselves produced by charging, plea-bargaining, and fact-finding processes.”). 
113. Albonetti, supra note 111, at 790. 
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female defendants than for male defendants.114  This indicates that federal 
judges are more likely to use their discretion to benefit female defendants 
than male defendants. 
The gender disparity in sentencing is not limited to violent crimes.  Studies 
of sentencing for nonviolent crimes reveal benevolent sexism in sentencing.  
Male defendants are more apt to have engaged in violent conduct than 
their female counterparts.115  Research on sentencing for nonviolent crimes, 
however, shows a similar pattern of benevolent sexism.  For example, a study 
by Professor Spohn of female and male defendants convicted of drug 
offenses in three federal districts found that even when the type of crime and 
background of the defendant are controlled, judges sentence men more 
harshly.116  Professor Albonetti found similar effects in an earlier study.117 
Thus, even for nonviolent crimes, female defendants fare better than male 
defendants. 
Benevolent sexism might work against female defendants in juvenile
court, however. Researchers argue that the paternalism that undergirds juvenile 
court produces a difference in how sexism manifests itself.118  Judges
might see girls as in greater need of supervision than their male counterparts.  
Although some studies bear this out,119 other research replicates the results
in adult criminal courts that female offenders fare better than their male 
counterparts.120  Some researchers suggest that the type of crime might
matter; juvenile girls convicted of “status” crimes, like running away, 
have violated gender norms and hence receive lengthier sentences than 
114. See generally id. at 789; David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender
Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 
(2001); Spohn, supra note 17. 
115. Men accounted for roughly 80% of persons arrested for violent crime, 2018
Crime in the United States: Table 33, supra note 35, and nearly 90% of all homicide arrests, 
ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 236018, HOMICIDE TRENDS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 3 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus 
8008.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJC7-4QGD].
116. See Spohn, supra note 17, at 96. 
117. See Albonetti, supra note 111, at 808. 
118. See Andrew L. Spivak et. al., Gender and Status Offending: Judicial Paternalism in
Juvenile Justice Processing, 9 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 224, 224 (2014). 
119. See Meda Chesney-Lind, Judicial Paternalism and the Female Status Offender:
Training Women to Know Their Place, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 124 (1977) (“Not only 
are girls charged with violations of their sexual role more likely than boys to be referred 
to court, but they are more likely than boys to be held in jails or juvenile detention facilities 
across the nation.”); Erin M. Espinosa, Jon R. Sorensen & Molly A. Lopez, Youth Pathways to 
Placement: The Influence of Gender, Mental Health Need and Trauma on Confinement in 
the Juvenile Justice System, 42 J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 1824, 1825, 1826, 1829 (2013). 
120. See Aaron Kupchik & Angela Harvey, Court Context and Discrimination:
Exploring Biases Across Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 50 SOC. PERSP. 417, 417–18, 427 
(2007) (“In the juvenile court, only 1.1% of females (and 8.8% of males) are incarcerated, and 
in the criminal court, only 10.3% of females (and 23.0% of males) are incarcerated.”). 
120
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their male counterparts for the same offense.121  Similarly, a study of adult
criminal sentencing found that women who violate traditional gender roles by 
committing violent crimes more commonly associated with male perpetrators 
also receive harsher punishment than men.122  The most common result of 
this research, however, is that judges impose shorter sentences on women. 
Archival studies of actual sentences, just like archival studies of rulings 
in family courts, inevitably present interpretive difficulties. Pinning down
the disparate treatment of male versus female offenders and parents to
their gender, as opposed to other characteristics, is challenging.  Observing
and controlling for every difference between male and female defendants 
and parents that might affect judges is close to impossible. We thus used 
controlled experiments to test for sexism in judges.  We focused on the two
areas of family law and criminal sentencing because these are areas in which
we expected implicit and explicit biases to exert influence.  Furthermore,
the field studies suggest that judges treat men and women differently in
these areas of law. 
III. FAMILY COURT: METHODS, JUDGES, AND RESULTS
To test whether judges exhibit gender-based preferences in rulings involving 
the balance between childcare and career in divorce proceedings, we 
presented a one-page hypothetical scenario involving a child mobility 
decision to 355 judges in the United States and Canada.123  We used the
same basic fact pattern for both countries. 
121. John M. MacDonald & Meda Chesney-Lind, Gender Bias and Juvenile Justice 
Revisited: A Multiyear Analysis, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 173, 179–80, 189–90 (2001) (analyzing 
years of data from Hawaii and finding that “at disposition, girls are more likely to receive 
harsh dispositions for relatively minor offenses.”). 
122. See Sergio Herzog & Shaul Oreg, Chivalry and the Moderating Effect of
Ambivalent Sexism: Individual Differences in Crime Seriousness Judgments, 42 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV., no. 2 2008, at 45, 48–49 (collecting sources for the proposition that treating 
women more leniently at sentencing may be limited to female offenders who conform to 
traditional gender roles). 
123. The National Judicial Institute of Canada translated the Canadian version of the 
materials into French for the Canadian Francophone judges.  The English version is included, 
infra, in the Appendix.  We use the term “gender” to describe the litigants because the materials 
use names and pronouns that suggest gender; the materials do not refer to biological sex. 
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The materials asked the judges to “[i]magine that you are presiding over
a family court case involving a six-year-old girl and her four-year-old 
brother whose parents divorced two years ago.”  The materials indicated 
that the parent with primary custody had requested permission to “move 
with the children from City A, where they currently reside, to City B, 
which is located in a different state (about 200 miles away from City 
A).”124  The noncustodial parent opposed the relocation of the children.
The materials then provided a rough description of the relevant case 
law. The version varied slightly by country.  In the United States, the materials
asked judges to assume that the law in their jurisdiction allows them “to
grant the request provided you determine the move is consistent with the 
best interests of the children.”  This was kept in a somewhat generic format 
because, as described below, the judges in the United States came from
multiple different jurisdictions. In Canada, the materials listed the factors 
Canadian judges must address when considering such requests:
1) The parent applying for a change in the custody order must meet the threshold
requirement of demonstrating a material change in the circumstances affecting 
the child; 
2) If the threshold is met, the judge on the application must embark on a fresh 
inquiry into what is in the best interest of the child, having regard to all the relevant 
circumstances relating to the child’s needs, and the ability of the respective parents to 
satisfy them.  (See Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27.) 
The materials noted that the custody decree awarded primary custody
to one parent, but the noncustodial parent “hosts the children three out of 
every four weekends, sees them occasionally during the week, and pays 
child support.”  The materials indicated that the parents were single and
lived near each other.  In the United States, the materials stated that “[n]one
of the grandparents or other close relatives live” near either the city in
which the parents lived or the proposed relocation city.  In Canada, the 
materials added that “[t]he move would also bring the children within an 
hour’s drive” of the parents of the custodial parent and that the parents
of the noncustodial parents “live far away from both cities.” 
The materials then described the custodial parent as having a Ph.D. in 
geology, having “worked at a small consulting firm that dissolved just before 
[the] second child was born,” and explained that the parent “was unable 
to find other employment in [their] field in City A, so [they] decided to stay
at home to care for the children.”  The materials indicated that the noncustodial
124. In Canada, the materials used “300 kilometers” instead, and indicated that the 
move would not relocate the children out of their home province. 
122
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parent “works for a large law firm in City A, doing highly specialized
work for investment banks.” 
The materials noted that the reason for the requested relocation is a
“lucrative” job offer to the custodial parent from a large mining company
in its corporate headquarters in the distant city.  The offer exceeded the 
noncustodial parent’s salary.  The materials then presented brief arguments 
for and against the move offered by each side. The custodial parent argued
that “the children would benefit financially from the move” enabling the 
parent “to pay for the children to attend a prestigious private school.”  The
noncustodial parent contended that the relocation would “uproot the children” 
and “force him to give up his career because he is unwilling to live so far 
apart from them.”  The noncustodial parent also argued that “due to the demands 
of the job” that the custodial parent was considering, “the children would
likely have to spend significant periods of time in day care or with a nanny.” 
The Canadian materials also added that the custodial parent “is unwilling 
to move without the children” and noted that the parent would turn down 
the job and remain at home with the children if the court denies the request. 
The Canadian materials further added the argument for the custodial parent
that it is the noncustodial parent’s “turn to sacrifice.”  Finally, the Canadian 
materials noted that grandparents were also far away from both the
original and the distant city, and hence were not a factor in the decision. 
The critical variable was the same in both versions: gender of the 
litigants. For half of the judges in each group, the materials identified the
custodial parent as the Mother; for the other half of the judges, they
identified the custodial parent as the Father.  All other aspects of the materials
were identical. Hence, we employed a between-subjects design.  Differences 
between the success rates of the custodial parent in the two conditions
would thus be entirely attributable to the gender of the parent requesting 
relocation.  Both versions of the hypothetical are included in the appendix. 
B. Judges 
We collected data from judges who attended judicial education conferences
in the United States and Canada.  Within the United States sample, two of 
the groups were family and juvenile court judges, and hence had special
expertise on this type of problem. 
We collected data from judges in the United States who attended one of 
several different judicial education conferences: 135 judges attending the 
American Judges’ Association conference in Denver, Colorado, in 2010;
44 judges attending the annual conference of the National Council of 
 123




















   
   
   
 
Group Sample %Female* % Republican* Experience* 
Size (years) 
Denver 134 29 (130) 33 (114) 12 (127) 
(AJA) 
Austin 44 54 ( 41) 26 (34) n/a 
(NCJFCJ)12s 
New York 69 61 (67) 25 (61) 8 (66) 
(Family) 
Canada 116 40 (108) n/a 7.25 (104) 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges in Austin, Texas, in 2015; and 69 
judges attending the New York State Association of Judges of the Family 
Court of New York Conference in Ithaca, New York, in 2019.  Each group 
of judges attended an educational session at which one of the authors 
presented research on the psychology of judicial decision making.  We 
gave the sessions titles that did not give a clear indication of the content 
of the surveys, for example, the Denver session was entitled “How Do Judges
Judge.” Each presentation was a plenary session, meaning that judges 
attending the conference did not select this session over others. 
As part of the session, the judges responded to several other hypothetical 
cases in addition to the one on relocation.  On the last page of the survey, 
we asked the judges to identify their gender,125 years of experience as a 
judge, and political orientation.126  Finally, we gave the judges the opportunity
to respond to the survey and participate in the educational program, but 
withdraw their survey for purposes of data analysis.  Two of the judges did 
this and were removed from the analysis.  Judges at the two national conferences 
in Denver and Austin came from all over the United States, although the 
vast majority were state court judges.127 We report the demographics of
the judges in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHICS OF JUDGES IN THE FAMILY COURT STUDY
128 
* Not all judges responded to questions on demographics.  We report
the number who answered the question in parentheses. 
125. We use the term “gender” in reference to the judges because we asked them to 
self-identify their gender, rather than their biological sex. 
126. We used the following question to elicit political orientation: “Which of the two 
major political parties in the United States most closely matches your own political 
beliefs?”  We then listed the two major parties with a blank next to each for the judges to 
check.  Most judges answered this question; we scored those who did not answer or who 
wrote “other” as missing responses on this question.  We did not ask this question of 
Canadian judges. 
127.  All but three of the judges were trial judges.
128.  National Conference of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. 
124
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Condition (Moving Partv) 
Mother Father 
Denver (AJA) 72 (61) 47 (73) 
Canada 65 (55) 51 (59) 
New York (Family) 19 (31) 16 (32) 
Austin (NCJFCJ) 43 (23) 43 (21) 
Generalist Combined 70 (116) 48 (132) 
(Canada and Denver) 
Specialist Combined 30 (54) 26 (53) 
(New York and Austin) 
TOTAL 56 (170) 42 (185) 
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We obtained the Canadian sample of judges in a similar fashion.  The 
Canadian judges were attending an annual conference organized by the
National Judicial Institute of Canada in 2010, 2018, and 2019.  The National 
Judicial Institute of Canada runs this conference each year for trial judges 
who have served between five and ten years.  Judges in Canada are not obliged
to attend the conference.  Each year, it draws about forty judges. Our
session was entitled “The Working of the Judicial Mind.”  It was a plenary
session at the conference, and all of the judges in attendance completed 
the survey. Across all three years in which we administered this survey 
question, we collected results from 116 judges at these three conferences.
Among the Canadian judges 20% were French-speaking.  All of them had
five to twelve years of experience, except for seven “facilitators,” who had 
more than twelve years of experience.
C. Results 
In the combined sample of 355 responses,129 56% (96 out of 170) of the
judges allowed the female parent to relocate, whereas 42% (78 out of 185) 
of the judges allowed the male parent to relocate.  The difference between 
the two conditions was statistically significant.130  Table 2 reports the results 
by judge group. 
TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF JUDGES ALLOWING MOVE, BY GENDER OF 
MOVING PARTY AND JUDGE GROUP (AND SAMPLE SIZE) 
129.  Eight judges did not respond. 
130.  Fisher’s Exact Test, p < 0.01. 
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As Table 2 illustrates, the judges in Denver and in Canada reacted 
similarly. Both groups favored the Mother.  The judges at the Austin and
New York conferences, however, expressed very little difference.  The 
judges in Denver and Canada were mostly judges of general jurisdiction.  
That is, although some probably have had some experience with family 
court, most were judges who hear a variety of civil or criminal matters.  
They expressed a large difference; 70% granted the Mother’s request, but 
only 48% granted the Father’s request.  The judges in Austin and New York, 
by contrast, were family and juvenile court specialists.  These judges did 
not show much of a preference for the Mother (30% versus 26% for 
the Mother and the Father, respectively).  Gender of the moving party thus 
had a significant effect on the generalists,131 but not on the specialists.
Across all groups, the male judges were somewhat more likely than the 
female judges to favor the Mother.  Among the male judges, 61% (58 out 
of 95) granted the Mother’s request, as compared to 43% (45 out of 104) 
who granted the Father’s request—a difference of eighteen percentage points.  
Among the female judges, 51% (34 out of 67) granted the Mother’s request, 
as compared to 43% (31 out of 72) who granted the Father’s request— 
a difference of eight percentage points.  The difference between the male 
and female judges, however, was not significant.132 
Political orientation did not interact significantly with the condition.133 
Among the judges who identified as Democrats, 51% granted the Mother’s
request (34 out of 67), as compared to 40% who granted the Father’s 
request (31 out of 77).  Among the judges who identified as Republicans, 
42% granted the Mother’s request (10 out of 24), as compared to 32% who 
granted the Father’s request (12 out of 37).  More experienced judges tended 
to be more inclined to grant the motion, regardless of the gender of the moving 
party, but this tendency did not interact with gender of the moving party.134 
Among just the specialized judges, experience had no effect.135 
131.  Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.02. 
132. Logistic regression of the judges’ decision on the condition, judge’s gender, and
an interaction of condition and gender showed that the interaction term was not significant.  
z = 0.92, p = 0.36. 
133. Logistic regression of the judges’ decision on the condition, party, and an
interaction of condition and party showed that the interaction term was not significant.  
z = 0.04, p = 0.97. 
134. Logistic regression of the judges’ decision on the condition, years of experience, and 
an interaction of condition and experience showed a main effect for experience, z = 2.37, 
p = 0.02, but the interaction term was not significant.  z = 1.34, p = 0.18. 
135. Logistic regression of the judges’ decision on the condition, years of experience, and 
an interaction of condition and experience among only the specialized judges showed no 
main effect for experience, z = 0.17, p = 0.87, nor the interaction term.  z = 0.42, p = 0.67. 
126
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IV. CRIMINAL SENTENCING: METHODS, JUDGES, AND RESULTS
To test whether a defendant’s gender affects judges’ sentencing decisions, 
we administered a one-page scenario involving a criminal sentencing
decision to 210 federal judges and 141 trial judges from Ohio.  We presented 
nearly identical fact patterns to both the federal and state judges.  The 
questions asked, however, varied slightly to match the sentencing systems 
in each jurisdiction.136 
A. Materials 
We presented both the Ohio and federal judges a one-page scenario
involving a defendant named either Frank or Lisa Smith.  The materials 
indicated that Smith had filed for disability benefits, claiming that he or
she could not work and needed assistance to remain in his/her home and 
keep his/her daughter from starving. A caseworker, however, had denied 
the claim after concluding that Smith was still able to work.  The materials 
stated that the caseworker subsequently received a threatening letter 
which said, “I’m going to get even with you for taking away our home.” 
The letter included a photo of the caseworker’s home and “a printout of 
instructions on how to make a crude explosive downloaded from a web 
site.” The materials stated that the police quickly identified Smith as the 
perpetrator who sent the letter.  Smith was charged and pled guilty. 
The materials further explained that Smith was “31 years old, widowed, 
and was living with his/her nine-year-old daughter (although the daughter
is now living with Frank’s parents).  S/He has no criminal history. S/He is in
good health, does not abuse drugs or alcohol, and was earning $40,000 per
year, but is now unemployed.” 
In Ohio, the materials indicated that Smith was charged with “threatening 
retaliation against a public official under Ohio Revised Code § 2921.05(A).” 
They stated that “‘Retaliation’ is a ‘felony of the third degree.’ Ohio Revised
Code § 2929.14(A)(3) provides for a prison term of ‘one, two, three, four, or
five’ years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000 under ORC § 2929.18(A)(3)(c).” 
The materials then asked the judges to sentence Smith, but to disregard 
the fine. 
The federal materials differed slightly to reflect federal law.  They indicated 
that the FBI, rather than the police, conducted the investigation and
that Smith was charged “under 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (sending threatening
136.  We include both versions infra in the Appendix.
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communications through the U.S. mail).”  The materials also placed the
sentencing decision within the context of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.  They noted that 
[u]nder § 2A6.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines a threat has a base
offense level of 12.  The prosecution has agreed that the sentence level should be
reduced by 2 levels for accepting responsibility for the crime, thereby producing
an offense level of 10.  The prosecutor, however, has argued that 6 levels should 
be added, as “the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out 
such threat” under § 2A6.1(b)(1), which would raise the offense level to 16. 
The materials then asked the federal judges two questions.  First, they 
inquired whether the total offence level should be “10” reflecting “A base 
of 12 for the offense minus 2 for accepting responsibility (which yields a 
sentencing range of 6 to 12 months)” or “16” reflecting “A base of 12 for
the offense minus 2 for accepting responsibility, plus 6 for conduct evidencing 
an intent to carry out the threat (which yields a sentencing range of 21 to
27 months)[.]”  Second, the materials asked the judges to assign a sentence 
in months. Although we provided no instructions on departure from the 
sentencing range, the judges could either have sentenced within the range
prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines or departed from it. 
B. Judges 
All 351 of the judges who evaluated the sentencing scenario were attending
judicial education conferences.  As with the family court materials, the
sentencing scenario was part of a survey that included other scenarios.
These sessions were also plenary sessions, meaning that the judges did
not select this session out of special interest in the topic.  All of the judges
were afforded the option of opting out of participation or of having their
data used for this analysis. None did so.
The 141 Ohio judges had attended the Ohio Judges’ Association winter
conference in Dublin, Ohio, in 2013.  All of these judges were Common Pleas
Judges in Ohio—an elected position.  They had an average of 15.2 years
of experience, with a median of 13.5 years.  Of the 141 judges who identified
their gender, 84% were male. Of the 137 who identified their political
orientation, 57% were Republican.
The 210 federal judges were all United States District Judges who had
attended one of two annual educational conferences organized by the Federal 
Judicial Center in Seattle and the District of Columbia in 2014.  They had 
an average of 16.4 years of experience, with a median of 17 years. Of
the 208 judges who identified their gender, 64% were male.  Of the 178 
who identified their political orientation, 37% were Republican.
128
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Defendant 
Male Female Combined 
Ohio 18.9 (63) [1.7] 13.8 (73) [1.3] 16.1 (136) [1.1] 
Federal 11.4 (104) [0.7] 9.4 (98) [0.7] 10.4 (202) [0.5] 
Combined 14.2 (167) [0.8] 11.3 (171) [0.7] 12. 7 (338) [0. 5] 
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C. Results 
1. Overall Sentence 
Judges sentenced female defendants more leniently overall.  As Table 
3 shows, the 167 judges who sentenced the male defendant imposed an 
average of 14.2 months, as compared to 11.3 months among the 171 judges 
who evaluated the female defendant.137  This difference was statistically 
significant.138  When tested separately, each group showed a significant 
effect as well.139  An analysis of the gender of defendant, type of judge—
Ohio or federal—and an interaction term revealed significant effects for 
gender of defendant, and judge type, but the interaction between the two 
was not significant.140 
TABLE 3: AVERAGE SENTENCE IN MONTHS, (SAMPLE SIZE), AND 
[STANDARD ERROR] BY DEFENDANT GENDER AND JUDGE 
Male and female judges reacted differently to this problem.  As Table 4 
shows, male judges imposed an average sentence that was 3.7 months less
on female defendants than on male defendants, whereas female judges 
imposed an average sentence that was only 0.7 months less on female 
defendants. Both the federal and the Ohio judges showed a similar pattern.
137. Note that because the Ohio judges sentenced in years and the federal judges in 
months, we multiplied the Ohio results by twelve whenever the two groups were combined 
for the analysis.  Thirteen judges did not reply. 
138. t(336) = 2.74, p = 0.006. 
139. Ohio: t(134) = 2.35, p = 0.02; federal: t(200)= 2.14, p = 0.03. 
140. F(1, 337) = 11.29, p < .001; F(1, 337) =31.51, p < .001; F(1, 337) =1.99, p = 0.16,
respectively for condition, judge, and the interaction.  As Table 3 shows, federal judges 
imposed shorter sentences than did the Ohio judges. 
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Defendant 
Male Female Male :Minus Female 
Ohio-Male 19.4 (52) [1.9] 13.4 (62) [1.5] 6.0 
Ohio-Female 16.4 (11) [4.4] 16.4 (11) [3.4] 0.0 
Federal-Male 11.5 (73) [7.0] 8.6 (57) [7.2] 2.9 
Federal-Female 11.2 (30) [6.0] 10.7 (40) [6.8] 0.5 
Combined-Male 14.8 (125) [LO] 11.1 (119)[0.9] 3.7 
Combined-Female 12.6 (41) [1.4] 11.9 (51) [1.1] 0.7 
The interaction between gender of judge and gender of defendant was not 
significant.141  
TABLE 4: AVERAGE SENTENCE IN MONTHS, (SAMPLE SIZE), AND 
[STANDARD ERROR] BY DEFENDANT GENDER AND JUDGE 
Analysis of political orientation showed that Republican judges sentenced 
defendants to longer terms on average than Democratic judges: 15.6 versus 
10.8 months.  This effect was significant, but did not interact with gender 
of the defendant.142  Years of experience had no effect.143 
2. Intent in Federal Judges 
The federal judges faced two choices: first, whether “the offense involved 
any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat”; and second, the
choice of the actual sentence.  The judges also could have departed from
the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  The federal judges thus had to
make three determinations: 1) whether the defendant was likely to carry out
the threat, which would produce a sentence enhancement under the Guidelines; 
2) whether they should depart from the Guidelines range, either upward 
or downward; and 3) what sentence they should impose.  The gender of the 
defendant could have affected any or all of these decisions. 
141. Analysis of variance (“ANOVA”) of sentence on gender of defendant, gender 
of judge, and an interaction term revealed no significant main effect for gender of judge, 
F(1, 335) = 0.31, p = 0.58, and no significant interaction term.  F(1, 335) = 1.46, p = 0.22. 
142. ANOVA of the sentence on gender of defendant, on political party, and an
interaction term revealed a significant main effect for party, F(1, 304) = 15.6, p < 0.001, 
but not a significant interaction.  F(1, 304) = 0.46, p = 0.50. 
143. ANOVA of the sentence on gender of defendant, on years of experience, and 
an interaction term revealed no significant effect for experience, F(1, 334) =0.96, p = 0.32, 
and no significant interaction.  F(1, 334) = 2.62, p = 0.11. 
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Our analysis showed that the gender of the defendant did not significantly
influence the judges’ assessment of whether the offense involved an intent 
to carry out the threat.144  Among the judges who evaluated the male defendant,
37% (39 of 103) determined that the defendant intended to carry out the 
crime, as compared to 30% (27 out of 90) judges who evaluated the female 
defendant.  We observed no differences in this choice by gender of the judge, 
experience, or political orientation.145 
Most of the federal judges imposed sentences within the range prescribed
by the Guidelines.  For those judges who concluded that the defendant
intended to carry out the threat, the Guidelines range was twenty-one to
twenty-seven months, and for judges who concluded otherwise, the range 
was only six to twelve months.  As Table 5 shows, we observed little difference 
by gender of defendant among judges who concluded that the defendant
intended to carry out the act; 47% of the judges evaluating the male defendant
imposed a sentence below the Guidelines range on the male defendant, as 
compared to 46% of the judges evaluating the female defendant.  Among
judges who did not conclude that the defendant intended to carry out the 
threat, however, we did observe a modest difference, with 13% of the 
judges who evaluated males imposing a sentence below the Guidelines range 
as compared to 26% of the judges who evaluated females.  This trend was
not significant, however.146 
144.  Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.29. 
145. Male and female judges gave nearly identical responses on this parameter.
Among the male judges, 36% (25 of 72) decided that the defendant had the intent to carry 
out the crime, as compared to 31% (16 of 52) among the male judges who evaluated the 
female defendant.  Among the female judges, these percentages were 37% (11 of 30) and 
30% (11 of 37), for the male and female defendant, respectively.  We conducted a separate 
logistic regression of the choice on condition, each of the three demographic parameters 
(gender of judge, political orientation, and experience), and an interaction term.  None of 
the interaction terms were significant.  z’s < 0.80, p’s < 0.40. 
146. Excluding the three judges who imposed a more severe sentence than the 
Guidelines range, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.11. 
 131




























   
 
 
   
Gender of Intent? (Range) 
Defendant No (6- 12 month range) Yes (21- 27 month range) 
N % % % N % % % 
below within above below within above 
Male 62 13 84 3 36 47 53 0 
Female 62 26 73 2 26 46 54 0 
Total 124 19 78 2 62 47 53 0 
Gender of Defendant 
Intent? (Range) 
No (6- 12 month range) Yes (21- 27 month range) 
Male 2.9 (52) [0.4] 0.8 (18) [0.3] 
Female 1.8 (45) [0.4] 0.6 (14) [0.5] 
Total 2.4 (97) [0.3] 0.8 (320) [0.3] 
TABLE 5: SENTENCING DEPARTURES, IN PERCENTAGES, BY 
ENHANCEMENT DECISION AND CONDITION 
The tendency for lenience towards the female defendant among the federal 
judges thus occurred because judges imposed sentences at the lower end
of the Guideline ranges for female defendants. 
In Table 6, we report the average number of months above the minimum
—within range—sentence that the judges imposed by gender of defendant 
and the decision on intent. For example, we scored a judge who concluded
that the defendant did not intend to carry out the threat and imposed six 
months a “0”; and we scored a judge who concluded that the defendant
intended the threat and imposed twenty-four months as “3.”  We only included
judges who sentenced within the range for purposes of this analysis. 
TABLE 6: AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS ABOVE MINIMUM OF 
SENTENCING GUIDELINE RANGE AMONG JUDGES WHO SENTENCED 
WITHIN THE RANGE BY INTENT CHOICE WITH (SAMPLE SIZE)
AND [STANDARD ERROR] 
Table 6 reveals a trend among the judges who found that the defendant 
lacked the intent to carry out the threat; they imposed shorter sentences
when they were evaluating a female, rather than a male, defendant. This
trend was not significant, however.147 
147. ANOVA of the sentence by gender of defendant, determination of intent, and 
an interaction term revealed that gender of defendant was not significant.  F(1, 125) = 
132
58-1_POST_RACHLINSKIWISTRICH_PAGES FINAL_ (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2021 4:38 PM     
 

















   
  
[VOL. 58:  101, 2021] Benevolent Sexism in Judges 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
To summarize, it appears that judges who concluded that the defendant
did not intend to carry out the threat were more likely to depart downward
from the Guidelines when evaluating female defendants.  Judges who did 
not depart from the Guidelines used the lower end of the sentencing range 
for female defendants more frequently than for male defendants.  Taken 
together, these tendencies produced a lower overall sentence for female
defendants.  Gender of defendant did not influence judges who concluded 
that the defendant intended to carry out the crime, however.
V. DISCUSSION
Our experiments document clear evidence of benevolent sexism in 
judges.  Judges favored mothers over fathers on a child mobility issue and 
sentenced a male defendant more harshly than a female defendant.  Even 
in a context in which every other characteristic was held constant, judges 
favored female litigants. The results support the findings from archival 
research in family law and sentencing that judges themselves are contributing
to disparities in the justice system on the basis of gender.  Numerous studies
show that women have advantages as litigants in family law and every 
study concerning the impact of offender gender on sentencing in adults shows
that women draw more lenient sentences than men.  Although research
showing these results invariably contains confounding unobserved factors 
that undermine a clear finding that sexism plays a role, when data gathered
in archival studies is combined with the current data, a clear portrait of
benevolent sexism among judges emerges.
The pattern of results from the federal judges provides a good indication 
of how this sexism manifests.  The federal judges did not see the male defendant 
as more likely to commit the violent act.  Instead, they simply used the 
discretion they had to impose lower sentences on female defendants.  This 
only occurred among the judges who concluded that the defendant was not 
apt to commit the violent act.  The result is consistent with judicial sympathy 
for a nonviolent female defendant and is also consistent with the research 
showing that judges impose more lenient sentences on nonviolent female 
offenders.148  Accordingly, leniency for female defendants does not arise
1.96, p = 0.11.  Intent was significant, F(1, 125) = 11.25, p < 0.001, owing to the fact that
judges who concluded the defendant intended to carry out the threat almost exclusively 
used the low end of the sentence range. 
148. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
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from an implicit association with men and violence, but from a more
generalized sympathy for female defendants. 
Sympathy for female defendants might actually arise from sympathy 
for the children of female defendants. In the sentencing scenario, the
defendant was a single parent of a nine-year-old child.  One of the judges
explicitly stated that “sentencing a mother is much more difficult than
sentencing a father.” This possibility links our two studies.  If judges
generally see mothers as better parents than fathers, then they may be both 
more inclined to defer to a mother’s choices about relocation and more
reluctant to impose a harsh sentence on a mother than on a father. 
The impression that mothers are generally more engaged parents than 
fathers is not without foundation, of course.  The vast majority of single-
parent households are headed by mothers,149 and mothers are more likely 
to seek custody of children in divorce.150  Most people think of mothers as 
more nurturing and attentive to children than fathers.151  Judges in our study
might simply have been reacting to these tendencies, both by deferring to 
the mother’s relocation preference and by imposing a lenient sentence on 
the mother in the criminal case. 
Although understandable, the judges’ reliance on impressions of mothers
creates pathologies in the courtroom that harm both men and women.  Most
obviously, the stereotyping that likely produced the results we obtained is 
unfair to male defendants who do not receive the same empathetic treatment 
as female defendants.  It is also potentially harmful to fathers.  Expressing
biases that favor mothers is inconsistent with egalitarian norms and commands.
Judges certainly may make an individualized determination that a defendant
is entitled to sympathetic treatment.  They must often exercise discretion
to identify which of two parents is entitled to greater control over child-
rearing decisions. But judges should not make such decisions solely on
the basis of gender. Benevolent sexism also reinforces stereotypes of women 
as serving a primary role as caregivers, which not only harms men, it likely
undermines women’s claims in other contexts.  Female litigants who need
to convince a judge of their competence as a professional will be harmed by
the same stereotypes that helped women in our studies.  Likewise, female
defendants who act against stereotypes might find themselves treated more 
harshly.152 
149. Gretchen Livingston, About One-Third of U.S. Children Are Living with an 
Unmarried Parent, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/04/27/about-one-third-of-u-s-children-are-living-with-an-unmarried-parent/ 
[https://perma.cc/E4SL-UXW2].
150. Paradise, supra note 58, at 518. 
151. Cole et al., supra note 50, at 212. 
152. See Herzog & Oreg, supra note 122, at 49. 
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What can be done?  Judges have wide discretion in areas of law like 
sentencing and in family law.  Discretion can facilitate bias.  Clear standards 
from legislatures and appellate courts could reduce the influence of bias, 
but in many areas of law, discretion is essential.  Even though the Canadian 
Supreme Court tried to impose more order on relocation decisions, we 
found evidence of bias in that context.153  Hence, it is up to judges themselves
to find ways to minimize the influence of sexism on their decisions. 
In other work, we have described a range of approaches judges can take 
to ameliorate implicit bias in a wide variety of contexts.154  Judges can 
reduce their own biases by reminding themselves of stereotype-incongruent 
models such as esteemed professional women and devoted fathers.  They 
can also engage in thought experiments in cases, such as “consider the 
opposite,” in which they imagine the defendant or parent to be of the opposite 
gender. Further, judges can also self-monitor by keeping track of the outcomes 
of female and male litigants.  Because bias often arises from quick, intuitive 
thinking,155 judicial efforts to encourage more deliberative thinking in the
courtroom can also combat bias.  Judges have several ways to facilitate 
more deliberative thinking, for example: adhering to decision-making checklists; 
issuing tentative rulings while inviting feedback from the parties; and writing 
opinions—even if not published. 
Judges might have more difficulty overcoming sexism than racism or
other biases. Because benevolent sexism helps women in some ways and 
feels consistent with cultural norms, it might not seem as evil and is not 
as universally condemned as racial bias.  Therefore, judges who may be
implicitly influenced by it are neither as alert to it nor as motivated to
overcome it as were the judges in our previous research, who were able to
put aside their implicit racial bias when litigant race was made explicit.156 
This suggests that although judges may be able to overcome benevolent 
sexism, it may require greater training and effort than is necessary to overcome
implicit racial bias. 
153. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
154. Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision 
Making: How It Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: 
REDUCING BIAS 99, 104–19 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017). 
155. See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking 
on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–43 (2007) (discussing 
how intuitive thinking may lead to biases in judges). 
156. See generally Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich & Guthrie, supra note 47, at 1197,
1221–26. 
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Judges are bound by oath and by law to avoid bias and prejudice in their 
decisions. We believe that judges strive to honor those commitments. They
are also human beings, however, who live in a culture that affects how all
of us think. Our results show that these influences can sway judges when 
they make decisions.  They sometimes dispense compassion and sympathy 
in ways that track cultural stereotypes.  Avoiding reliance on stereotypes
will require training and discipline by judges.  But we are optimistic that
they can do so.  We find cause for this optimism in the fact that more expert 
judges in our parental relocation problem treated mothers and fathers 
evenhandedly.
136
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VI. APPENDIX: MATERIALS
Parental Relocation [substitute the opposite gender for alternative 
version]: Denver
Imagine that you are presiding over a family court case involving a six-
year-old girl and her four-year-old brother whose parents divorced two
years ago. The mother has requested that you authorize her to move with
the children from City A, where they currently reside, to City B, which is 
located in a different state (about 200 miles away from City A).  The father 
contests the relocation. 
Assume in your jurisdiction that the law allows you to grant the request 
provided you determine the move is consistent with the best interests of 
the children. 
Pursuant to the custody decree, the mother has primary custody, although 
the father hosts the children three out of every four weekends, sees them 
occasionally during the week, and pays child support. The parents, who 
have remained single, live only a mile apart in City A. None of the grandparents
or other close relatives lives near either City A or City B. 
The mother holds a PhD in geology.  She worked at a small consulting 
firm that dissolved just before her second child was born. Because her
work is so specialized, she was unable to find other employment in her
field in City A, so she decided to stay at home to care for the children.
The father works for a large law firm in City A, doing highly specialized
work for investment banks. 
Recently, a large mining company offered the mother a lucrative position 
in its corporate headquarters in City B.  The mother asserts that the new 
job would enable her to restart her career.  The company has offered her 
a salary that exceeds the father’s current salary. The mother argues that
the children would benefit financially from the move.  In particular, she 
argues that her new position would enable her to pay for the children to 
attend a prestigious private school.
The father opposes the relocation because it will uproot the children. 
He also argues that the move would force him to give up his career because 
he is unwilling to live so far apart from them.  He further notes that due 
to the demands of the job the mother has been offered, the children would
likely have to spend significant periods of time in day care or with a nanny.
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Imagine that you are presiding over a family court case.  The case involves
a six-year-old girl and her four-year-old brother.  Their parents were granted 
a divorce two years ago.  The mother has requested that you allow her to 
move with the children from City A, where they now reside, to City B (which
is in the same Province as City A, but is 300 km away).  The father strongly 
opposes the request. 
The test for parental mobility is: “1) The parent applying for a change in
the custody order must meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating
a material change in the circumstances affecting the child; 2) If the threshold
is met, the judge on the application must embark on a fresh inquiry into 
what is in the best interest of the child, having regard to all the relevant 
circumstances relating to the child’s needs, and the ability of the respective 
parents to satisfy them.” See Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27.
Pursuant to the custody decree, which the parents worked out themselves
and stipulated to, the mother has primary custody, although the children
spend three out of every four weekends with the father.  The parents live
only two kilometers apart in City A.  The father also makes an effort to
see the children during the week, as much as his job permits.  The custody 
arrangement has worked smoothly and both children seem well adjusted. 
At present, the father pays child support.  By the agreement of the parents,
all marital assets were divided roughly equally during the divorce, except 
that the mother retained ownership of the home in which they had lived 
as part of her share. Neither parent has remarried. 
The mother holds a PhD in geology.  She worked at a small consulting 
firm that dissolved just before her second child was born. Because her work 
is so specialized, she was unable to find other employment in her field in 
City A, so she decided to stay at home to watch the children.  The father works 
for a large law firm in City A, doing highly specialized work for investment
banks. 
Recently, a large mining company offered the mother a lucrative position 
in its corporate headquarters in City B. The mother asserts that the new
job would enable her to restart her career. The company has offered her 
a salary that exceeds the father’s current salary.  The mother argues that
the children would benefit financially from the move, even though the 
father would likely make far less money at any position he could find in 
City B. In particular, she argues that her new position would enable her
138
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to pay for the children to attend a prestigious private school. The move 
would also bring the children within an hour’s drive of her parents (his 
parents live far away from both cities). 
The father opposes uprooting the children.  He also argues that the move
would force him to give up his career because he is unwilling to live so far 
apart from them.  The father further notes that due to the demands of the job
the mother has been offered, the children would likely have to spend significant 
periods of time in day care, or with a nanny.
The mother is unwilling to move without the children. If the court denies
her request, she will remain unemployed and stay home with them. She
argues that she has spent time watching the children at home and that it is 
the father’s turn to sacrifice for her career. 
Would you grant the mother’s request to move the children to City B? 
Yes _____ No _____ 
Sentencing: Federal Case
United States v. Smith 
You are presiding over a criminal trial involving a defendant named
[Frank/Lisa] Smith. The facts of the case are as follows:
Several months ago, [Frank/Lisa] filed for disability benefits. S/He
asserted that s/he had been injured in a car accident and was unable to 
work. S/He stated that food stamps and other assistance would keep [him/
her] and [his/her] daughter from starving, but that they would have to move 
and would suffer severe hardship if s/he were denied benefits.  A caseworker 
denied [his/her] claim for benefits after concluding that the medical testimony
indicated that [Frank/Lisa] was still able to work. 
Shortly after the determination, the caseworker received an anonymous 
letter at his home. The letter included a photo of the caseworker’s house.
The person who had taken the photo included a note stating, “I’m going
to get even with you for taking away our home.” Attached to the letter
was a printout of instructions concerning how to make a crude explosive 
device which had been downloaded from a website. 
The FBI investigated the case and determined that [Frank/Lisa] was the 
person who took the photo and sent the letter.  [Frank/Lisa] was arrested
and charged under 18 U.S. C. § 876(c) (sending threatening communications
through the U.S. mail). 
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[Frank/Lisa] elected to plead guilty and is now appearing before you for
sentencing. The pre-sentence report states that [Frank/Lisa] is 31 years
old, widowed, and was living with [his/her] nine-year-old daughter (although
the daughter is now living with [Frank’s/Lisa’s] parents).  S/He has no criminal
history. S/He is in good health, does not abuse drugs or alcohol, and once 
earned $40,000 per year as a bus driver, but is now unemployed.  
Under § 2A6.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines a threat has 
a base offense level of 12.  The prosecution has agreed that the sentence
level should be reduced by 2 levels for accepting responsibility for the crime, 
thereby producing an offense level of 10.  The prosecutor, however, has
argued that 6 levels should be added, as “the offense involved any conduct
evidencing an intent to carry out such threat” under § 2A6.1(b)(1), which
would raise the offense level to 16.
In sentencing [Frank/Lisa], which of the following would you assign as
[his/her] total offense level: 
_____ Offense level 10: A base of 12 for the offense, minus 2 
for accepting responsibility (which yields a sentencing range 
of 6 to 12 months) 
_____ Offense level 16: A base of 12 for the offense, minus 2 
for accepting responsibility, plus 6 for conduct evidencing 
an intent to carry out the threat (which yields a sentencing
range of 21 to 27 months)
Based on the facts of this case, what sentence would you impose on
[Frank/Lisa]? ________ months 
(Please disregard the fine for purposes of this question.) 
Sentencing: Ohio
State v. Smith 
You are presiding over a criminal trial involving a defendant named
[Frank/Lisa] Smith. The facts of the case are as follows:
Several months ago, [Frank/Lisa] filed for disability benefits. S/He
asserted that s/he had been injured in a car accident and was unable to 
work. S/He asserted that food stamps and other assistance would keep
[him/her] and [his/her] daughter from starving, but that they would have 
to move and suffer severe hardships if s/he were denied benefits.  A caseworker
denied [his/her] claim for benefits after concluding that the medical testimony 
indicated that Frank was still able to work. 
Shortly after the determination, the caseworker received an anonymous 
letter at his home. The letter included a photo of the caseworker’s house. 
The person who had taken the photo included a note stating, “I’m going to
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get even with you for taking away our home.” Attached to the letter was a
printout of instructions on how to make a crude explosive downloaded from 
a web site.
The police investigated the case and determined that [Frank/Lisa] was
the person who took the photo and sent the letter.  [Frank/Lisa] was arrested
and charged with threatening retaliation against a public official under 
Ohio Revised Code §2921.05(A). 
[Frank/Lisa] elected to plead guilty and is now appearing before you for
sentencing.  The pre-sentence report states that [Frank/Lisa] is 31 years old, 
widowed, and was living with [his/her] nine-year-old daughter (although the 
daughter is now living with [Frank’s/Lisa’s] parents).  S/He has no criminal
history.  S/He is in good health, does not abuse drugs or alcohol, and was 
earning $40,000 per year, but is now unemployed. 
“Retaliation” is a “felony of the third degree.”  Ohio Revised Code 
§2929.14(A)(3) provides for a prison term of “one, two, three, four, or five” 
years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000 under ORC §2929.18(A)(3)(c). 
Based on the facts of this case, what sentence would you impose? 
 ________ years. 
(Please disregard the fine for purposes of this question.) 
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